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Abstract The learning sciences of today recognize the tri-dimensional nature 
of learning as involving cognitive, social and emotional phenomena. However, 
many computer-supported argumentation systems still fail in addressing the socio-
emotional aspects of group reasoning, perhaps due to a lack of an integrated 
theoretical vision of how these three dimensions interrelate to each other. This 
paper presents a multi-dimensional and multi-level model of the role of emotions in 
argumentation, inspired from a multidisciplinary literature review and extensive 
previous empirical work on an international corpus of face-to-face student debates. 
Bringing together argumentation studies and research on collaborative learning, we 
employ a linguistic perspective in order to specify the social and cognitive 
functions of emotions in argumentation. The cognitive function of emotions refers 
to the cognitive and discursive process of schematization (Grize, 1996, 1997). The 
social function of emotions refers to recognition-oriented behaviors that correspond 
to engagement into specific types of group talk (e. g. Mercer, 1996). An in depth 
presentation of two case studies then enables us to refine the relation between 
social and cognitive functions of emotions. A first case gives arguments for 
associating low-intensity emotional framing, on the cognitive side, with cumulative 
talk, on the social side. A second case shows a correlation between high-intensity 
emotional framing, and disputational talk. We then propose a hypothetical 
generalization from these two cases, adding an element to the initial model. In 
conclusion, we discuss how better understa<nding the relations between cognitive, 
social and emotional phenomena can inform pedagogical design for CSCL. 
 
Keywords Argumentation * Collaboration * Emotions * Group Cognition 
Introduction 
In the last twenty years, two major theoretical shifts renewed cognitively 










consisted of the extension of the concept of cognition from an individual to a 
collective, socio-cultural perspective, with the emergence of research on ‘group 
cognition’ (Stahl, 2006), and the pragma-dialectic model in argumentation theory 
(Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). The second is the so-called ‘affective turn’, 
characterized by the inclusion of the affective dimension of learning, with a view 
on cognition that does not separate emotions from reason. In argumentation studies, 
some authors also took this turn, or claim that it is necessary to include emotions in 
argumentation models (e. g. Gilbert, 2004; Plantin, 2011), although they remain a 
minority in the community. The book edited by Baker, Järvelä and Andriessen, 
Affective Learning Together (2013) is emblematic of this renewed conception of 
learning processes as consisting of 3 key components: cognitive changes, social 
practices and emotional behaviors. However in practice, studies in CSCL focus on 
only one of these dimensions, or at most try to articulate two of them. Computer-
supported argumentation systems, for instance, often take for granted an idealized, 
monological and unemotional version of Toulmin’s model (1958) to describe 
arguments (Scheuer, Loll, Pinkwart, & McLaren, 2010). Of course, such 
approaches fail in addressing the socio-emotional dimensions of actual group 
argumentative practices. This may result from the absence of theoretical models of 
how they interrelate to each other. This paper proposes to contribute to this 
challenge, the exploration of which has only recently begun, by presenting a model 
of the social and cognitive functions of group emotions in argumentation. As we 
aim at encompassing a variety of group reasoning settings, our model is based on 
the typical face-to-face argumentative interaction, but we believe that it is easily 
adaptable to the specificities of CSCL or CSCW contexts. 
Our perspective is situated at the crossroad of argumentation studies and 
research on collaborative learning, and mostly inspired by linguistics. However, we 
are aware that only long-term dialogue between several disciplines can successfully 
achieve this goal. Insights from social psychology, for instance, would undoubtedly 
enrich this first model. Still, this contribution aims at offering a theoretical basis of 
discussion to the interdisciplinary and international community of computer-
supported collaborative learning, to foster integration into a coherent, multi-
dimensional and multi-level vision of collective reasoning.  
Our work on group emotions began with an empirical study of class activities 
aimed at producing group reasoning. Herein, we propose a model that we believe 
applicable to a wide range of group reasoning settings, including professional 
contexts. For a heuristic purpose, we present not only the model itself, but also 
empirical analyses to show how the model can be applied and potentially adapted 
to interpret authentic data. First, we present the pedagogical situation and data in 
depth. A second section then specifies our theoretical model and presents the multi-
disciplinary literature that inspired it. The third section of this paper is organized 










the cognitive functions of emotions for group reasoning. The first case (4.1) shows 
that low-intensity emotional framing on the cognitive side tends to be associated 
with consensual footing and disagreement avoidance on the social side. Case 2 
(4.2), on the contrary, establishes a link between high-intensity cognitive emotional 
framing and social engagement with disputational talk, when a competitive footing 
and rivalry prevail. These cases generate a global hypothesis interpreted in 
reference to the initial model (4.3). In conclusion, we discuss the potential and 
limitations of the final, refined model specifically for CSCL design. 
1. Educational context and dataset 
We believe that achieving a high transparency about the context in which this 
model was developed permits others to appraise how our conceptual tools can be 
applied or adapted to other contexts. Moreover, the two case studies described in 
section 4 are based on data that were part of the same global corpus. Thus, we first 
specify the pedagogical situation, and then present the nature of the videotaped 
data. 
1.1 Pedagogical situation: the YouTalk ‘scientific café’ activity 
The YouTalk scientific café-type activity was co-designed by our research group 
in collaboration with a non-profit, informal science education organization Les 
Petits Débrouillards, under a grant from the regional government. It consists of an 
extra-curricular activity held at school, during the school day, and while the 
students (aged 12-14) are grouped as in an existing class (often a science class), 
even though the event requires modification of their regular class schedule. The 
activity is generally justified to the students as providing environmental or 
citizenship perspectives on other subjects. The event lasts between 1h30 and 2h. A 
key aspect of YouTalk is that elder students1 (aged 15-16) lead the activity. The 
spatial organization of the class seeks to reproduce the ‘café’, that is in a large room 
with chairs arranged around tables with each table defining a working group of 3-5 
students. Students are generally allowed to choose where and with whom they are 
seated. The macro-script of the café alternates between class discussion, working-
group discussion, group vote and individual vote, and the whole activity is based on 
a multiple choice questionnaire slide show. Some questions, called ‘knowledge 
questions’ represent stable knowledge for which there is a recognized correct 
answer.  These questions aim at mobilizing certain types of knowledge and 
providing basic information on the topic. Other questions, called ‘opinion 
questions’, for which all of the options presented are potentially true, are used to 
stimulate socio-scientific debate. The general topic was current and future drinking 










1.2 International corpus of videotaped data allowing multiple-scale analysis 
Seventeen cafés were videotaped in Mexico, the USA, and France using the 
same general macro-script. A complex recording setting allowed the researchers to 
do multiple-scale analysis and to study what was occurring at both individual, small 
group, and class levels. The data for each café, include: a global view of the 
classroom and moderators’ activity, a screen capture of the slide show, and local 
views of 2 to 4 table-groups. Ten cafés were selected for analysis based on criteria 
of completeness and coherence of the entire event (no technical or logistical issues) 
and in order to obtain a reasonable volume of commeasurable data. Several aspects 
of students’ argumentation were analyzed: type of collaboration in small group, use 
of different argumentative resources (knowledge, norms and emotions), and a 
comparative study of debate framing along the three countries (Polo, 2014). This 
extensive empirical work led us to develop conceptual tools to characterize 
emotional and social aspects of students’ discourse in relation to cognitive-focused 
educational goals, which we now propose to integrate into a global model.  
2. Emotions in argumentation: a multidisciplinary literature review 
In this second section, we provide a multi-disciplinary literature review on the 
role of emotions in argumentative interactions, focusing on the aspects that inspired 
our theoretical model, notably perspectives on emotions coming from 
argumentation studies and considerations of emotions drawn from the literature on 
collaborative learning. Table 1 summarizes the key features of these two lines of 
research. Our model of group emotions in collective reasoning is then introduced. 
2.1 Emotions in empirical approaches to argumentation 
The institutionalization of argumentation studies as a field, in the end of the 20th 
century, has been accompanied by the development of a critical stance on emotions, 
perceived in a normative perspective as fallacious or potentially fallacious (e. g. 
Hamblin, 1970, Walton, 1992). Nevertheless, a recent approach in argumentation 
studies, reviving perspectives from Ancient Rhetorics, takes a descriptive 
perspective on authentic discourse and empirically studies how people use 
emotions as resources to argue (e.g. Micheli, 2010; Plantin, 2011; Hekmat, Micheli, 
Rabatel, 2013; Plantin, 2015).  
Adapting work from psychology (e. g. Cosnier, 1994) into linguistics, Plantin 
(2011) proposes diverse indicators for studying emotions more or less explicitly 
invoked in argumentative discourse. While the critical analysis approach names and 
denounces fallacious appeals to participants’ emotions, such analysis does not 
necessarily imply precise labeling. Instead, affects are rather characterized along 










the strength of the affect) (e. g. Plantin, 2011; Cahour, 2013). Plantin (2011) 
specified for each axis several ‘emotioning parameters’. On the intensity axis, the 
emotional distance to the issue is considered (in terms of people concerned, space 
and time), the degree of control over the situation, agentivity and causality from 
which the situation is described as resulting. Other parameters contribute to the 
construction of the valency axis: life-death continuum, anticipated consequences, 
analogies and conformity to established norms. Such emotioning parameters are 
studied in discourse, and might appear more or less explicitly. They can be 
analyzed by examining the use of a specific emotional lexicon (indignation is 
necessarily related to the accusation of a responsible agent, for instance, while 
sadness is not), or in reference to cultural topoi (for example, in Western culture, a 
burial is expected to be sad). As a consequence, this type of analysis does not claim 
to apprehend people’s actual feelings, but rather the emotions that they express 
through discourse about themselves, others, or the topic2.  
Polo and her colleagues combined Plantin (2011)’s tools with Grize’s (1996, 
1997) concept of schematization to better understand how emotions work as 
resources to argue, and play a role in the cognitive process of arguing (Polo, 
Plantin, Lund, Niccolai, 2013). A schematization corresponds to both a cognitivo-
linguistic process of characterizing-and-appraising an object, and the resulting 
product of its representation in discourse. The schematization of a discourse object 
involves cognitive moves which are visible through linguistic operations, and 
which cast light on selected aspects of the object, producing a specific 
representation of it. This representation is not neutral (Grize, 1996, 1997), but 
argumentatively oriented. The term ‘orientation’ refers to the work of Anscombres 
and Ducrot on argumentative value of language itself (Anscombres & Ducrot, 
1997), which is here expanded to larger discursive units. Part of this 
‘argumentativeness’ of the schematization of discourse objects relies on its 
emotional framing (Polo et al., 2013). Any emotional tonality associated to a 
discourse object, more or less positive, negative, strong, slight, or even neutral, 
results from active discursive work conveying a specific, argumentatively-oriented 
vision. This notion of emotional schematization corresponds to one of the cognitive 
ways emotions can function. According to Lipman, “emotions highlight; they make 
things stand out; they are sources of salience" (2003, p. 129). 
In summary, this line of research studies two types of research objects: 
emotional tonality attached to discourse objects, and emotional feeling attached to 
an experiencer (Plantin, 2015). In the first case, a specific emotional framing is 











2.2 Emotions in research about collaborative learning 
CSCL, and, more generally, research on collaborative learning, generally 
accepts that emotions play a role in the socio-cognitive processes related to 
learning. This literature recognizes two different impacts of emotions on 
collaborative learning.  
On one hand, emotions appear to have a positive impact on learning by fostering 
socio-cognitive conflict (Roschelle & Teasley, 1995). Such effects have been 
studied for conceptual or practical change, deepening of the space of debate, or 
even improvement in knowledge (e.g. Andriessen, Pardijs, Baker, 2013; Baker, 
Quignard, Lund, van Amelsvoort, 2002; Sins & Karlgren, 2013). On the other 
hand, some studies show that emotions related to argumentative interactions can be 
detrimental to group achievement. Facing a socio-cognitive conflict implies 
disagreeing. This can lead to some tensions as thematizing disagreement 
corresponds to an undesirable move in ordinary conversation (Traverso, 1999; 
Pomerantz & Heritage, 1984), which can be difficult to manage3. The cognitive 
process can be disturbed by these tensions and participants might use relaxation 
strategies that do not foster argumentation and learning (e. g. Andriessen, Pardijs, 
Baker, 2013). These results concerning the potential negative impact of emotions 
led educational researchers and practitioners to claim that there is a need to develop 
studies and tools for emotion awareness and emotion regulation (e.g. Järvenoja & 
Järvelä, 2013).  
CSCL authors generally apprehend emotions as participants’ actual feelings. 
Nevertheless, they mostly rely on discursive clues to assess group reasoning, 
identifying the type of collective talk developed among the students or co-workers 
(e.g. Mercer, 1996; Asterhan, 2013; Michaels, O’Connor, Sohmer, & Resnick, 
1992). In this field, two oppositions structure the study of emotions: a focus on 
individual emotions (shame, motivation, etc.) versus a focus on emotional events 
occurring at the group level (trust, group efficacy feeling, etc.); and the distinction 
between timescales (long-term collaborative climate and group history versus local 
emotional constructs occurring during a specific task). 
 
Table 1. Emotions in research on argumentation studies and collaborative 










2.3 Group talk and social recognition-oriented emotions 
We would like to point out here that some research in collaborative learning, which 
studies the quality of student talk in groups, addresses phenomena that can be 
interpreted in terms of group emotions (without being named as such). We do not 
have space for an exhaustive literature review here, but we would like to mention a 
work that we find useful to address the sociocognitive process of collective 
reasoning, notably Mercer and his colleagues categories of exploratory, cumulative 
and disputational talk (Fernández, Wegerif, Mercer, Rojas-Drummond, 2002; 
Mercer, 1996, Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Mercer, Neil, Wegerif, Dawes, 1999; 
Mercer and Sams 2006; Wegerif, Littleton, Dawes, Mercer, Rowe, 2004; Wegerif 
& Mercer, 1997).  
Exploratory talk, considered of higher educational value, is defined as an 
efficient and explicit form of collaboration in which ‘reasoning is visible in the 
talk’ (Mercer, 1996, p. 363). Thanks to the sharing of evidence and explicit 
reasoning, this type of talk provides a basis for what Gouran (2004) calls a 
‘constructive conflict’, focused on issues rather than personalities. On the contrary, 
disputational talk corresponds to little sharing of information and reasoning and 
‘disagreement and individualized decision making’, embodied in ‘short exchanges 
consisting of assertions and counter- assertions’ (Mercer, 1996, p. 369). 
Cumulative talk is also considered of low educational value, even if it is highly 
collaborative, because it is limited to a discussion in which speakers accumulate 
ideas uncritically, through ‘repetitions, confirmations and elaborations’ (Mercer, 
1996, p. 369).  
In addition to the necessary cognitive ability, a group would engage in 
exploratory talk only if it corresponds to the perceived socially relevant form of 
talk, identified on the basis of specific emotions expressed in the interaction. These 
emotions are associated to how social recognition is ensured in the dialogue. This is 
strongly related to linguistic politeness. Engaging in argumentation implies 
changing one’s way of seeking face preservation3, and, in particular, a change in 
the status of disagreement, considered as an undesirable move in ordinary 
conversation. The students might experience uncertainty about the ongoing 
politeness rules (ordinary or argumentative). In this context, the expression of 
recognition-oriented emotions work as clues for the group members to engage in a 
common type of group talk. When a participant expresses emotions about whether 
her/his face is well preserved or endangered by a given interactional move, others 
can adjust their behavior accordingly.  
In cumulative talk, the participants seek face preservation through agreement 
rather then by elaborating on the objects under discussion, and avoid disagreement. 
In disputational talk, face is strongly attached to the individual’s opinions, and 










precisely characterized by the fact that social recognition does not rely on 
agreement to individual opinions, but rather on cognitive group achievement 
through the discussion process (Wegerif & Mercer 1997). Engaging in high-quality 
group interaction requires the students to adopt a politeness system in which there’s 
no shame in expressing ill-structured ideas or changing one’s mind, nor 
aggressiveness in criticizing others’ views, nor sadness at not convincing 
everybody that one’s initial idea was the best. Students rather experience happiness 
at shifting from individual initial arguments to collective stronger ones, which 
corresponds to intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci 2000). In Lipman’s (2003) terms, 
we can say that exploratory talk requires the students to become ‘self-corrective’ as 
a group, self-correctiveness being a key feature of critical thinking. 
3. A model of group emotions in collective reasoning 
In figure 1, we present a model that articulates these theoretical backgrounds in 
order to propose a global picture of the role of emotions in the discursive, socio-
cognitive process involved in reasoning together. For research purposes, a clear 
distinction is made between their social (dark boxes) and cognitive (white boxes) 
functions, but, of course, these are in reality occurring together as part of the same 
global sociocognitive activity.  
An interaction never starts from scratch. Each student or participant comes to the 
table with his or her own preexisting internal emotional state, which includes a 
priori feelings about the objects to be discussed, and the subjects to be involved in 
the task. On the cognitive side, the initial formulation of the issue to be debated by 
the group also constitutes an a priori framing of the activity, which is not 
emotionally neutral. When the interaction starts, some aspects of these pre-existing 
entities are selected and filtered, adopting a discursive form to be shared among the 
participants. Then, two phenomena, one social, the other cognitive, take place 
gradually and give birth to two types of emotional discursive entities: the 
semiotization of participants’ feelings and the emotional framing of discourse 
objects. These two emotional entities are unceasingly recreated during the debate, 
in real-time, with each participant monitoring his own and others’ manifested 
feelings, and specifying the vision of the problem that he is acquiring through an 
appropriate emotional schematization. We refer to these two phenomena as the 
social and the cognitive functions of group emotions. 
3.1 Social and cognitive expressions of emotions at the individual level 
On the social side, the politeness system and, more specifically, the obligation to 
preserve one’s and others’ face (facework) (Goffman, 1974; Brown and Levinson, 










their own and others’ feelings. At the individual level, participants manifest and 
interpret feelings in relation to their choice of adopting a more or less collaborative 
self-identity footing, which can either be a) consensual, and avoid thematizing 
disagreement to preserve their own and others’ faces; b) constructively critical, 
seeking face preservation through group achievement; or c) competitive and try to 
have their own ideas win over others’.  
On the cognitive side, participants define and categorize the problem in the 
course of discussion, insisting on some aspects more than others. This 
schematization process is partly emotional: the objects, as they emerge in 
discourse, are given an emotional tonality (Polo et al., 2013). This process orients 
the discourse toward the defense of an argumentative claim. At the individual level, 
one decides to argue for one alternative, competing, within the debate, with one or 
several other options (here, options A, B, C, D, E or F). To simplify the model, in 
figure 1, we only represented two options: claim C and claim –C. 
 
Figure 1. The functions of emotional entities in the sociocognitive activity of 










3.2 Sociocognitive alignments and resulting group-level phenomena 
In group reasoning, the participants adjust their individual positions (both social 
and cognitive), through processes of (dis)alignment. Through interactional 
alignment, the participants become engaged in a specific type of group talk, either 
disputational, cumulative or exploratory (Fernández, Wegerif, Mercer, Rojas-
Drummond, 2002; Mercer, 1996; Mercer & Littleton, 2007; Mercer, Wegerif, 
Dawes, 1999, Mercer and Sams, 2006, Wegerif, Littleton, Dawes, Mercer, Rowe, 
2004; Wegerif & Mercer, 1997). When each member of the table-group is aligned 
on a consensual footing, the group talk is cumulative; when they are aligned on a 
constructively critical footing, the group talk is exploratory; and when they are 
aligned on a competitive footing, the group talk is disputational. Exploratory talk is 
characterized by the fact that social recognition relies on cognitive group 
achievement. In cumulative talk, the discussion of the issue is restricted to a non-
controversial process, the participants seeking face preservation through consensus. 
On the contrary, in disputational talk there is strong disagreement but little 
collective reasoning. Face is then strongly attached to the individual’s opinions, and 
criticisms are seen as offenses and lead to counter-attacks. 
Through argumentative alignment, the persons defending the same 
argumentative claim develop a similar emotional position toward the issue. An 
emotional position associated to the defense of claim C emerges in discourse, 
ep(C). Its counterpart, for people defending the rival option –C, is the emotional 
position ep(-C). Here, the collective configuration does not refer to the material 
group, but to an ad hoc entity based on intellectual affinity. It might group students 
together that are sitting at different tables. Sides arise in the whole classroom, 
during the debate, opposing students with different argumentative claims and 
associated emotional positions. Each time a participant contributes to the debate in 
favor of option C (or –C), his discourse will be argumentatively oriented toward C, 
through an emotional phasic move toward ep(C) (or ep(-C)). Here the adjective 
‘phasic’ is employed in opposition to the ‘thymic’ emotion: the latter corresponds 
to the initial affective state, disturbed by the emergence of, phasic emotional 
variations (Plantin, 2011). In the psychological tradition, the thymic mood refers to 
the ‘normal state of composure’ that a subject experience before the occurrence of 
an emotional episode, which in turn is referred to as a ‘phasic’ move, characterized 
by a raise in affective feeling (e. g. Cosnier, 1994; Wierzbicka, 1995). Once the 
emotional episode is over, a subject’s emotional state gradually turns back to his 
initial thymic level, more or less quickly, depending on the intensity of the phasic 
emotion. In this model, as in previous work on the role of emotions in 
argumentation (Polo et al., 2013), we adapted these categories to qualify the debate 
itself rather then an individual affective experience. Methodologically, this allows 
one to distinguish between the global tonality of the debate, which serves as a 










moves in discourse corresponding to the use of emotional schematization strategies 
to defend a given option, which are referred to as ‘phasic’ variations. 
3.3 Debate outcomes at the class level 
In terms of outcomes, the sum of the phasic emotional moves resulting from turn-
taking between people defending competing options, on the cognitive plane, gives 
an overall emotional framing to the debate. A resulting thymic tonality emerges, 
which can be different from the preexisting emotional framing due to the 
formulation of the problem. On the social plane, the type of group talk impacts the 
quality of the arguments used, in terms of complexity and dialogism. When 
exploratory talk occurs, for instance, the students are able to render their initial 
ideas more complex by integrating others’ counter-arguments, and they finally 
deliver stronger arguments. This reflects a deepening of reasoning. Independently 
of who voiced the initial idea or its critical assessment during the group discussion, 
the final argument made by an individual is strengthened by previous group talk. 
This can be described in terms of rebuttals in reference to Toulmin’s pattern of an 
argument (1958). 
4. Relations between social and cognitive functions of group emotions 
This section presents two case studies elaborated with reference to this model, 
which in turn generate hypotheses about how the relationship between the social 
and the cognitive functions of group emotions can be specified. More specifically, 
these cases constitute an argument for suggesting that the nature of group talk is 
related to the overall thymic framing of the debate. The first one presents a 
correlation between cumulative talk and low-intensity thymic framing, and the 
second shows a correlation between disputational talk and high-intensity thymic 
framing. In a third subsection, we provide a theoretical interpretation of these 
relationships by proposing a “zooming in” complement to the model presented in 
the introduction.  
4.1 Case 1: correlation between cumulative talk and low-intensity thymic framing 
In the available data, cumulative talk was correlated with low-intensity emotional 
framing of the issue. In small groups, the students do not necessarily focus on the 
goals set by the exercise: “while working in classroom groups, children use talk to 
do much more than engage in curriculum tasks: they form relationships, develop 
social identities, and pursue ‘off-task’ activities which may be more important to 
them than the tasks in which they officially engaged – and, as Wegerif (2005) has 
argued, may be essential to the process of establishing good relationships so that 










shows that they are little centered on the objects of debate as the thymic emotional 
tonality is low. The group of Louise, Pamela, Sabrina and Kelly, in the US school, 
illustrates this correlation.  
During the first opinion question, the four girls clearly engage in cumulative 
talk, but, later in the café, while debating the third opinion question, they turn to 
emblematic exploratory talk. The two complete dialogues are provided in the 
appendix. To conduct a linguistic analysis of group talk, we operationalized it into 
a set of 5 indicators, which are all positive when the girls debate on OQ3. We do 
not have space here to detail all the analysis of this episode as being exploratory, 
but we provide an instance of compliance with each one of these indicators to show 
how our methodology is concretely applied with clear discursive markers. 
1) Are assertions and refutations are justified? We then search for segments of 
discourse such as the highlighted part of the following utterance (turn 1): 
LOU  er: i think it should be priced by its quality because if [you'd have better quality it's just more work   
to like produce it\    
2) Do the participants elaborate on the argumentative content of previous turns? 
Such topical alignment are sometimes embedded in gestural or verbal repetitions, 
as in the following example with Kelly’s rephrasing of ‘work to produce’ into 
‘production’, adding a referential gesture, which Louise repeats at turn 4: 
1. LOU er: i think it should be priced by its quality because if [you'd have better quality it's just more work to  
like produce it\    
2. KEL                  [((nodding head in the affirmative, 
 looking at Louise)) 
3. KEL em: there's more [production <((turning hands)) for it to>    
4. LOU  [((turning hands))  
3) Do they critically evaluate each other’s arguments? Studying this indicator 
usually implies large sets of dialogues. We here only reproduce two opposed turns 
of the conversation: 
8. SAB and what about (.) family income/ you need water\    
(…) 
12. LOU they could like they could overu:se like they could (.) not pay as much and <((turning hands)) get     
    more water> 
After a collective elaboration of Sabrina’s proposition, at turn 8, to have the price 
of water depend on family income (turns 9-11), Louise, at turn 12, expresses a 
concern for a potential undesirable effect of this proposition. She is then taking a 
critical stance on Sabrina’s claim.    
4) Is everybody taken into account when making a collective decision? In our data, 
the students have to come to a common group answer on each opinion question, 
which is then displayed in front of the whole class. Still, we believe that, even in 










explicit choice. It is essential to understand that concern to have all the group 
members’ consent for the decision does not necessarily imply that the group 
reaches a consensus. Here, the students solve the problem by selecting on option 
but ensuring that the other option that some group members got interested in would 
also be expressed during the class debate: 
41. PAM  just put C and i'll explain like why we think D too\    
42. KEL  yeah:\    
43. SAB  <((putting card C)) well i'm putting C\>    
44. LOU  C\   
5) Do the individual contributions gradually integrate the rest of the group’s 
supporting or opposing argumentation? Or rather, do they only voice the speaker’s 
own initial ideas? The pedagogical situation studied allows us to easily track this 
type of elaboration, thanks to the alternation of discussion between the group and 
the class level. Here, Pamela actually rephrases the different viewpoints developed 
earlier in the group, when she takes part to the debate at the class level: 
PAM oh yeah C and D because em: like we chose C because em: like (0.9) <((opening hands, turned to 
the sky)) oh i can't really explain> <((hands back to the table)) but like (0.5) however like like however 
like much time it's putting like (0.3) prod- like producing the water/ should be like (1.0) sold at a higher 
price like if it's like more better quality it should be sold at a higher price but if it's just (0.5) <((skeptical 
face)) regular water [i guess> like it should just be  (0.7) like affordable\ and then we  (0.2) thought D 
too because em: we thought that like less fortunate families shouldn't be like (0.5) punished not really 
punished but shouldn't like (.) have like a: <((moving hands)) lack of water> because (.) of like their 
jobs or whatever their income    
These indicators also make it possible to specify sequences of talk which are not 
exploratory. Cumulative talk, especially, is characterized by very low critical sense 
(indicator 3), as if the discursive and interactive exploration was restricted to the 
uncontroversial side of the issue. This is the case when the girls discuss about OQ1. 
They then all agree that the most promising source of water for the future is 
economizing water currently available through a more careful exploitation of 
existing resources. They stick to uncontroversial discourse objects, by collectively 
elaborating a list of environmentally friendly practices, more or less related to the 
question. Here, the issue does not seem important enough to them to thematize 
disagreement and argue about it. They rather turn to the usual environmental 
education doxa, which they all agree to and feel familiar with, without applying any 
criteria to distinguish between more or less relevant examples. For instance, when 
Kelly mentions the chemicals polluting the grass at washing one’s car (turn 31), 
nobody questions how this point relates to the topic. 
Coming back to our issue of examining the relations between the social and 
cognitive functions of emotions in group argumentation, a striking result is also that 
these two dialogues strongly differ in terms of thymic emotional framing and 
display of signs of (dis)engagement. In the cumulative discussion about OQ1, the 
‘cold’ framing of the issue allows the girls to formally deal with the task in a very 










the whole group is more engaged in debate about OQ3, which shows higher thymic 
tonality. More specifically, in their discourse about OQ1, a key emotional 
parameter, the distance to the people concerned, contributes to the development of 
a low thymic intensity. Throughout the discussion, the girls discursively present the 
problem as quite far away from them. They rarely involve themselves into the 
discussion, and mainly use the third person (turns 7,9, 14, 19, 25), talking about the 
‘people’ who waste water (turn 5). They only use the second person ‘you’ twice, in 
a general meaning (turns 19 and 26). The inclusive pronoun ‘we’ (first person 
plural) is only used during the following class debate, to report their previous 
discussion, still with a general meaning. The pronoun ‘they’ only appears, in their 
discourse, as members of a collective entity who wastes water, and who should 
provide some effort in order to avoid wasting too much, but the girls never present 
themselves as potential victims affected by a lack of water. This parameter is very 
different when the girls debate about the third opinion question. The distance to the 
issue is much shorter, producing a much more intense, or ‘warmer’ thymic framing 
of the discussion. The girls present the problem of determining the price of 
drinking water as a matter that they are directly concerned with, as much as 
anybody (‘all people’, turn 14 ; ‘everyone’, turn 18). The two general formulations 
are made using the second person, more engaging than the third person (turns 1 and 
8). A great part of the debate is about whether or not every one should, including 
poor people, have access to drinking water. At this point, Louise is the only one 
using the third person, which is consistent with her opposition to the proposition 
that the price of water should depend on family income. This precise phasic 
increase of the distance to the people concerned is clearly an argumentative 
strategy. On the contrary, when Louise suggests considering family income, at turn 
8, Sabrina sticks to the use of the second person: ‘you need water’. In doing so, she 
does not present the financial accessibility as ‘other people’s problem’, but frames 
it as a global concern involving everybody, including her. Sabrina’s utterance also 
tends to ‘warm the debate up’ by referring to the idea of necessity. It is not only a 
matter of moral positioning or ecological principle, but also a concrete problem of 
material survival, tending to the extreme ‘death’ pole, on the valency side (a 
consequence schematized as very unpleasant). Similarly, aligned with Sabrina’s 
phasic increase, Pamela, at turn 9, presents the risk of lacking water in a radical 
version, as not having water at all (‘not get water’). 
Moreover, when they discuss the first opinion question, the students display 
signs of disengagement, which are absent in the exploratory debate about the third 
opinion question. During the cumulative discussion, they produce several long 
pauses, check the time, stretch, yawn (turns 35, 36, 37, 41). Therefore, one could be 
tempted to conclude that the emotional distance to the issue, discursively created on 
the cognitive side, mirrors the students’ actual emotional degree of engagement. 










emotional state, but only the image of this state as manifested by the students in 
their discourse and behavior. Moreover, in psychology, there is still a debate about 
whether or not an internal emotional state can be disconnected from its external 
expression, and, if so, about the direction of causality between the two4. Our 
interpretation is rather that the emotional schematization of the problem contributes 
to the argumentative orientation of the debate and structures potential interactional 
behaviors in a way that constrains expression of (dis)engagement. One cannot 
easily start yawning in front of someone who is talking about a matter of life or 
death, no matter how little one may sincerely feel concerned about the topic. 
4.2 Case 2: correlation between disputational talk and high thymic framing 
A clear case of disputational talk was found in the French sub-corpus. A group 
consisting of four girls, Klara, Samira, Isabelle and Asa starts disputing during OQ 
2, and engage in disputational talk again during OQ 3. Still, they manage to soften 
the conflict and organize a de-escalation during the rest of the café, avoiding 
another typical dispute during the last group debate on the main question. To do so, 
they mainly use a disengagement strategy. Even when confronted with a real 
sociocognitive conflict, the students solve associated tensions by social-only 
relaxation rather than sociocognitive strategies. This is consistent with previous 
work showing that group effective collaboration needs an optimal alternation of 
tension and relaxation phases (e.g. Baker, Andriessen, Lund, 2009). Actually, it 
seems that the four friends fail in managing a high-intensity emotional framing at 
the cognitive level by engagement in exploratory talk, and ‘solve’ the conflict by 
avoiding the issue, and backing away from the exercise, at the meta-discursive 
level. 
In reference to the above mentioned indicators used to operationalize the 
analysis of group talk, disputational talk is characterized by a rather negative 
indicator 1 (repetitions instead of justifications), intermediate indicator 2 (topical 
alignment), strong but unconstructive use of critical sense (indicator 3) and 
negative indicator 4 (decision-making practice seeking collective consent) and 5 
(actual sharing or ideas into more complex, dialogical arguments collectively 
owned). We here provide a few examples taken from the discussion of the four 
French girls on OQ2. The students repeat propositions and counter-propositions 
(2), without elaborating on the reasons for choosing or rejecting an option, which is 
necessary for constructive discussion (3), as in the following excerpt: 
8 KLA pff moi j'dis F\   (pff I say F\) 
9 ISA pas F quand même\   (not F\) 
10 KLA mais moi j'fais pas l'C hein\   (I do not do the C ok\) 
(…) 










14 ISA moi j'mets la E hein\   (I put E\) 
15 KLA oh non moi j'fais F\   (ah no I do F\) 
When it comes to making the final decision, no discursive work is undertaken to 
get everybody’s consent (4). Instead, without previously asking the others, Samira 
individually decides to put letter F on the stand, at turn 20, and tell them : 
SAM   bon j'ai mis F hein démerdez-vous\  (so i put F, just deal with it\). 
Klara, who agrees with Samira, is aligned with her attitude and displays overt 
disinterest in what the two other girls think, since her decision is already taken. 
This is embedded in turns 33 and 34:  
33 KLA nan mais ça <((geste de la main désignant Samira et Klara)) c'est notre avis à nous deux\> 
<((geste de la main vers les 2 autres)) vous euh mettez c'que vous voulez\>   (no but this <((pointing 
gesture at herself and Klara)) is the opinion of the two of us\> <((pointing at the others)) you er put 
whatever you want\> 
34 SAM ((remet la F))   ((puts F on the stand again)) 
Much later, at the end of the debate, when the moderator actually asks the students 
to put their chosen letter up, there is still no seeking for collective consent, but very 
conflicting gestures. Samira starts the de-escalation strategy by disengaging herself 
and holding a letter corresponding to Isabelle and Asa’s choice, even if she does 
not agree, just to get rid of the debate. See what happens then: 
171 KLA <((prenant le carton de la main de Samira et le donnant à Isabelle)) nan c'est pas toi qui 
l'soulèves toi t'es pas E c'est vous qui [l'soulevez>   <((taking the card from Samira’s hand and giving it 
to Isabelle)) no YOU don’t hold it up you’re not E YOU hold it up>  
172 SAM <((en levant le F)) nous on est F\ [klara nous on est F\   ([<((pulling lette F up)) we are F\ 
[klara we are F\) 
173 ISA             [<((en cherchant à baisser la main de Samira)) nan: 
mets-en pas deux\>   ([<((putting Samira’s hand down\)) no: don’t put two\>  
Finally, during the following class debate, this group only contributes twice on the 
basis of what was earlier said during the group discussion, each time with a student 
rephrasing her own initial idea, not enriched by a consideration of counter-
arguments. When they do so, the other students are simultaneous criticizing what is 
being said, with a low voice at the group level displaying no collective sharing and 
ownership of arguments. When Samira contributes to the class discussion, Asa 
even whispers to her: 
ASA   °tu mets pas ma bouche dedans°   (°don’t put my mouth in that°) 
This disputational talk was correlated, both in OQ2 and OQ3, with a very high 
thymic tonality. A complete inventory of students’ utterances concerning three 
parameters of emotional intensity is available in appendix B: people concerned, 
responsible agents, and spatio-temporal distance. At first sight, there is a 
contradiction between the way students present the people concerned, and their 
spatio-temporal framing of the topic.  
Spatio-temporally, the issue is presented as fairly far away from the students. 










of Africa, and places characterized by a dry climate, which is not the case in the 
area where the students live. The mention of Dakar is special in this perspective, 
since it is related to Asa’s family. Even if the place is geographically distant from 
where the discussion is taking place, to Asa, it may be nearer in terms of emotional 
distance due to the fact that it is where her grandparents live (a fact explicitly 
referred to). Still, on the temporal dimension, the students also build significant 
distance from the issue. In other words, the time when the situation would become 
threatening is presented as belonging to the future. Nevertheless, some variations 
appear: it is sometimes a near future, so close that the students themselves can 
imagine ‘the consequences’ of their current ‘acts’ will occur during their life; others 
represent the consequences further in the future more likely to affect the next 
generations, for example their ‘grandchildren’. An interesting feature of the 
temporal distance construction is that the current time is only explicitly mentioned 
as the moment when the acts causing the water issue are committed. 
When it comes to directly depicting the people concerned by the problem of 
access to water, the global picture is rather different, consisting of a high emotional 
proximity. Out of 41 utterances inventoried, 13 correspond to a first person footing, 
either in singular or plural form (French je, j’, nous, on), and 14 to the second 
person, mostly singular (t’, toi, tu), with also one plural form (vous).  Even when 
the third person is employed in this sequence, it often refers to close proximity to 
the issue. Two occurrences of ils (third person plural) in fact stand for the further 
employed vous (second person plural), corresponding to the present students who 
went to Russia on a scholar trip. The remaining four occurrences of the third person 
concern other close relationships: students’ future children (twice) or 
grandchildren, or Asa’s grandparents. Only 6 utterances use the third person (ils, 
autres) to refer to distant others. In terms of valency, the problem is only presented 
as radical and potentially leading to death in two occurrences, corresponding to 
distant others in danger of not having water at all (‘they don’t have water’, ‘they 
don’t have anything’). In the rest of the utterances, the people concerned, mostly 
the students themselves and their family, are characterized as water consumers 
facing the matter of how much they have to pay for water, and how much water 
they can use for their daily needs and their personal comfort. Lastly, Samira makes 
an original contribution to the group debate on OQ3 as she extends the issue as 
concerning humanity as a whole: ‘on est tous égaux et au fond on est tous des 
humains\ on a tous les mêmes droits\’ (we are all equal and in the end we are all 
humans\ we all have the same rights\).  
The contrast between the two parameters of spatio-temporal framing and people 
concerned show that the distance to the issue is not only determined by the 
objective external material conditions (the local situation with respect to water), but 
is truly discursively built. The students here, even if they are aware of not 










extensive work to take the issue seriously, both as a concern for all of humanity and 
as their own local problem.  
Lastly, the four girls spend significant time elaborating who is responsible for 
the evolution of the situation regarding the water issue. In total, 90 occurrences of 
linguistic markers qualify those taken for responsible (pronouns, names, etc). A 
structuring feature is the identification of the students with the agents responsible 
for a change leading to a better situation. This identification is made directly, by an 
extensive use of the first person singular (je, j’, moi), in 17 occurrences, and 
expression with a value of first person plural (on, nous), in 15 occurrences. The 
identification also relies heavily on the use of the second person singular, with the 
students directly accusing each other of being responsible for the situation. We 
counted 17 occurrences of tu or t’ and verbal forms in second person singular, and 
5 occurrences of direct citation of some students’ names (Samira and Klara). It is 
interesting to note that the alternation of first and second person has been proved as 
an effective empirically defining characteristic of the conflict genre (Denis, 
Quignard, Fréard, Détienne, Baker, Barcellini, 2012), which is consistent with the 
fact that the students here are engaged in disputational talk.  
The rest of the linguistic markers depicting the people responsible for the 
situation all use the third person, and present a variety of meanings. Fifteen 
occurrences of various forms of “he”, “she”, or “they” refer to the group of 
precursors who will initiate a change in their practices that would end up making a 
difference. There is a debate between the students on how many people are needed 
to actually have a meaningful impact, and whether or not it’s worth getting 
personally involved in this cause. As a result, the third person here sometimes 
stands for a first person plural value, when the students perceive themselves as 
belonging to this group of precursors. Isabelle’s utterance, during a side-discussion 
on opinion question 2, is emblematic of this figure: ‘si on est trois millions ça 
changera’ (if there are three million of us, that will make a difference). A second 
group of third person utterances corresponds to a general entity that does not 
explicitly include the students, but from which they cannot totally stand apart: 
‘people’. This global, poorly determined, agent is characterized by reluctance to 
change habits, egocentrism and laziness, and is defined as the majority of society’s 
members. A total of 14 occurrences refer to this entity. Several of these occurrences 
are embodied by the word personne (nobody), a radical form that also semantically 
includes the students themselves. A third instance of third person use consists of 
the people defined as the most responsible for the situation, their higher culpability 
due to the fact that they actually take advantage of the problematic situation (4 
occurrences). Here, there is usually no identification with the students, as it mostly 
concerns industries making money out of the situation. Surprisingly, one isolated 
occurrence of the on (we) presents similar features, during class debate on opinion 










can be understood as a feeling of collective culpability for the general organization 
of the society they belong to, a society that makes possible this kind of profit5.  
It is interesting to note that two of these occurrences of the third person can be 
considered as depicting both people concerned and responsible agents. The first 
one refers to children’s ‘parents’, whose lifestyle is related to the water issue, both 
as a cause of the environment problem and as a way in which this problem can 
affect them (here, they might have to clean dry toilets). The other occurrence with 
this double status is a third person plural (‘ils’, they) referring to the people lacking 
water because they might not pay for it. This sentence is ambiguous and does not 
enable us to decide whether such people are considered as social victims for not 
affording to buy water or whether they are presented as responsible for their 
problem, which would be to say that it’s their fault is they cannot even pay for 
water.   
All things considered, one can say that the emotional thymic tonality of the 
debate among the four students is very high along the intensity axis. A specificity 
of this case is that the proximity to the issue does not only rely on the identification 
with the people concerned but also, indeed mostly, with the people responsible for 
the evolution of the situation. Such framing implies auto and hetero accusations and 
culpability, favoring a feeling of being offended and needing to defend one’s self. 
This is consistent with the emotional characteristics of disputational talk along the 
social dimension of argumentation. 
Lastly, an interesting aspect of this dialogue is that the students produce a lot of 
meta-discursive commentaries on the activity they are engaged in. These 
commentaries are rather negative, and show that their argumentative norms 
associate debate with the polemical genre. Below we reproduce all of the students’ 
utterances6 describing their ongoing activity, during the group debate on the second 
opinion question, where they must hold up the letter A, B, C, D, E or F 
corresponding to their group choice7: 
ISA bah oui mais l'truc c'est [qu'on doit voter pour l'groupe\   (yeah but the thing is [that we must vote for the 
group\) (…) 
ASA [ah: tu m'affiches pas avec ça hein\   ([ah: don’t shame me by associating me okay\) (…) 
ISA <((en riant)) toi tu cherches pas l'embrouille>   (<((laughing)) you are not provoking the conflict>) (…) 
SAM <((riant)) nous on n'est pas d'accord klara\> [on va <((pose le poing sur la table)) débattre\>   
(<((laughing)) we do not agree klara\> [we’re gonna <((poses her fist on the table)) debate\>) (…) 
KLA <((prenant le carton de la main de Samira et le donnant à isa)) nan c'est pas toi qui l'soulèves toi t'es 
pas E c'est vous qui [l'soulevez>   (<((taking letter E from Samira’s hand and giving it to isa)) no it’s not 
you who must hold it up you’re not E you must [hold it up>) (…) 
ISA °<((riant, à ASA)) ça sent la guerre>°   (°<((laughing, to ASA)) this smells like war>°) 
Both lexicon and gestures refer to the semantic field of conflict and war. The 
analogy used to characterize the interaction is the one of a battle. While the 
moderator is announcing the next group debate, about OQ3, Samira expresses 










SAM   °on va s'taper là\°   (°we are going to start fighting again\°) 
Similar negative metadiscursive comments at the table on the nature of the ongoing 
activity continue during the discussion on OQ3: 
SAM   bon maint'nant on fait pas d'merde hein\   (so now let’s not just do shit okay\)   (…) 
ASA   ((entoure sa tête de ses mains simulant une grosse tête))   (puts her hands around her head to     
simulate a big head)   (…) 
SAM   isa tu défends ta cause\   (isa you defend your cause\)   (…) 
SAM   on est en train d's'entretuer\   (we are killing each other\)   (…) 
ISA    c'était d0'la merde\   (that was shit\)   (…) 
SAM   tout l'monde se dispute\   (everybody is arguing\)   (…) 
ASA   mais c'est bon arrêtez avec vot' débat on va pas parler\   (but it’s enough stop with your debate we’re     
not gonna talk\)   (…) 
ISA    t'arrêtes de t'exciter toi un peu là/   (you stop getting so annoyed, will you/) 
This representation of the activity contributes to the shift from strong individually 
opposed convictions on the issue to interpersonal conflict. The debate is mainly 
described in terms of its (potential) detrimental effects on participants’ 
relationships. Therefore, the activity is mostly thematized through its social 
implications, and very little is said at the metadiscursive level about the matter of 
conciliating or co-elaborating the alternative views on the topic. 
The girls finally turn to a cognitive disengagement strategy, which strengthens 
the group by reactivating a common role of ‘poor student’ that they seem familiar 
with. The negative stigma is explicitly mentioned and used as a shared identity 
feature for the (re)construction of group unity. During the class debate on OQ2, the 
students produce a self-devaluating discourse that correlates with strengthening the 
feeling of belonging to the same group: 
1 ISA   <((en regardant l’enseignante)) madame dupont>   (<((looking at the teacher)) mrs dupont>) 
2 KLA   eh elle va s'dire elle aura honte de notre classe\   (she’s gonna think she’s gonna be ashamed of our 
class\) 
3 KLA   aussi ils ont pris la pire classe comme ça euh ils ont pris les pires gens d'la classe 'fin\   (also they 
took the worst  class and then em they took the worst people in the class in fact\)    
4.3 Articulation of social and cognitive functions of group emotions: generalization 
The two case studies presented in the previous sections show a correlation 
between the thymic framing of a debate and the tendency to engage in distinct 
types of talk at the group level (disputational, exploratory, cumulative). In figure 2, 
we propose a representation of such correlations in reference to the model 
presented in figure 1, zooming in to the bottom part of it, focusing on the collective 
configurations structured by emotions on the cognitive and the social dimensions, 
and on their relations to the outcomes of the global argumentation. The model here 
serves as a basis for conceptualizing, at a theoretical level, the hypotheses 










framing. If future studies confirm these hypotheses, such refinement of the model 
would offer a more complex symbolization of how social and cognitive functions 
of group emotions are intertwined. 
 
Figure 2. Relation between the cognitive and social functions of group emotions 
in argumentation: complexification of the model. 
Group talk and the thymic overall emotional framing of the debate seem 
strongly linked. Our interpretation is not a one-way causal link, but rather a cycle 
of feedback. For instance, specific emotions that play a social function, such as 
feeling offended, may impact the emotional framing by influencing the participants 
to feel more or less concerned by, or responsible for, the issue at stake. Similarly, 
the construction of the distance to the issue, a key component of the cognitive 
functions of emotions, is likely to produce more or less intense feelings on the part 
of students depending on how consistent the problem appears to them. 
Theoretically, we represent this relationship as a continuum. In emblematic cases as 
those reported above, typical cumulative talk is associated with a low-intensity 
emotional framing and typical disputational talk corresponds to a high-intensity 
emotional framing. Still, many authentic interactional phases cannot be easily 
classified on the whole as belonging to one type of group talk (Polo, 2014, 199-
238), and they may admit different sequences also in terms of overall thymic 
tonalities. Therefore, we have no reason to theoretically exclude any potential 










In terms of educational concerns, this dynamic complement to the model has the 
advantage of highlighting that pedagogical tools and strategies aiming at fostering 
exploratory talk should address the matter of the optimal general emotional framing 
of the activity. 
Main conclusions and discussion 
In this final section, we first summarize the key conclusions of this article, and 
discuss the significance of our model for the theorization of group emotions, 
especially its implications for educational design. We then give directions for 
future work to build upon the present contribution. 
Theoretical significance of the model and main conclusions  
Distinguishing between social, motivational, affective, and cognitive dimensions 
of interactions aimed at reasoning together is not an easy task. For analytical 
purposes, we find it useful to differentiate in a dynamic model (2), the social and 
cognitive functions of group emotions, even if they are actually interrelated into a 
global sociocognitive and affective process. On the social side, group discourse can 
present features of different types of talk, corresponding to different types of 
politeness rules and facework. Participants may experience and display emotions 
related to the way in which their faces are engaged in such interaction. These 
feelings are decisive for the group process of turning either to exploratory talk, 
cumulative talk or disputational talk. On the cognitive side, the emotions in play do 
not concern the subjects (participants) of the interactions directly, but rather the 
objects being discussed. The emotional framing of the problem is inherent to the 
process of schematization, which orients the discourse towards a given 
argumentative conclusion. 
Still, this analytic approach remains simplistic compared to authentic occurring 
interactions. In order to better understand what happens when groups try to reason 
together, it is worth addressing the challenge of specifying the relations between 
these categories and how they can dynamically be influencing each other. From this 
perspective, two case studies are presented (4), showing a correlation between the 
type of collaboration that the students tend to develop in small groups and the 
emotional tonality characterizing their debate. This attitude questions the 
appropriate level of signified engagement, since discursively constructing the 
objects of the debate as more or less distant to the students seems to be related to 
how constructive the group interaction becomes. These results are consistent with 
previous literature. On one hand, the fact that cumulative talk is associated with 
low-intensity emotional framing confirms the need for minimal positive tensions to 










disputational talk is associated with high-intensity emotional framing as well as 
direct implication of the subjects of the interactions reflects that people are either 
concerned by and/or feel responsible for the issue. This  echoes the observation that 
feeling offended tends to inhibit group reasoning (Baker & Andriessen, 2009; 
Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998). These case studies led us to better integrate the social 
and cognitive functions of group emotions by questioning their relation. We finally 
propose a theorization of these results, on the basis of a representation of the links 
hypothetized for generalization. 
Our first aim was to build conceptual tools appropriate for the study of socio-
scientific debates among students, in order to make sense of our data. 
Retrospectively, we believe that this conceptual framework has a larger relevancy 
and deserves to be defined as a general theoretical approach that might be used in 
other contexts. This model might be useful for describing any situation in which a 
group is expected to reason together, either in educational or professional settings. 
Even if only long-term dialogue between scholars of multiple disciplines can fully 
achieve this goal, we consider this model as a first step toward the daunting 
challenge of theorizing how the social, the affective and the cognitive are 
intertwined in reasoning and learning. 
Practical significance of the model and implications for design in CSCL  
We would also like to emphasize a few implications of our model in terms of 
pedagogical design. First, we are doubtful of the restricted vision of emotion-
regulation that promotes pedagogical strategies aiming at rescuing pure ‘cognitive 
processes’ by separating them from (detrimental) emotions that are considered to 
be markers of fallacious reasoning. Instead, it might be fruitful to make the 
participants aware of the social role of emotions, and provide them scaffolding for 
efficient collective regulation (e.g. Järvenoja & Järvelä, 2013). The benefits of 
emotion awareness applied to the cognitive functions of emotions are not as 
obvious. Case study 2, on French data (4.2) shows that group awareness of ‘warm’ 
cognitive conflict can lead to social-only relaxation strategies, encouraging 
disengagement.  
We rather believe that consideration of the socio-affective dimensions, together 
with the cognitive, as fully integrated to the learning process must be embedded in 
the pedagogical situation itself. From a designer’s perspective, understanding the 
cognitive emotions underlying students’ engagement in more or less valuable forms 
of talk for educational goals is promising for fostering high quality student 
interactions. But in order to accomplish this, designers do not necessarily need to 
implement emotion-awareness tools, as extra marginal functions in their 
pedagogical environment. Indeed, optimal thymic framing should be reached as a 










students’ optimal emotional engagement in the activity can be addressed, for 
instance, by a careful choice of topics as well as attention to how the target 
knowledge is contextualized. Designers should also include socioaffective concerns 
in their global scripting of the activity (Weinberger, 2003; Dillenbourg & Jermann, 
2007), and not as an additional complementary tool.  
Discussion and directions for future work 
The proposed model has proved useful for deeply analyzing our data and has 
allowed us to formulate more general hypotheses on the relations between social 
and cognitive functions of emotions in groups trying to reason together. Some 
aspects still need to be confirmed by future studies. The correlation observed 
between group talk and the level of thymic intensity, in terms of emotional framing, 
is not sufficient to draw firm conclusions on the nature of causality between the 
two phenomena. In the presented case studies, arguing in favor of this relationship, 
we mainly focused on the intensity axis of emotional framing, and more 
specifically, on the distance from the issue. Further work on other data, and/or 
extending the analysis to other parameters of emotion construction on the cognitive 
side, including the valency axis, are needed to specify this relationship. 
In addition, we would like to specifically highlight two lines of research for 
which our model can serve as a basis. First, at the theoretical level, the matter of 
building a global understanding of how cognitive, social, and affective dimensions 
of reasoning are integrated requires further work. For instance, a common 
argumentative practice is the use of ethos-based strategies to defend a claim. In 
such discourse, the distinction between the subjects and objects of conversation 
vanish, since subjects themselves become a discourse object to a great extent. 
Studying this type of frontier case would be interesting to better understand how 
cognitive and social functions of emotions get intertwined. 
Our second focus for discussion and further investigation concerns educational 
practice. Here, the question is how can an optimal thymic framing for reasoning be 
defined and successfully reached in educational design? Can the thymic level of a 
debate be constrained, and how? On the social side, by rendering politeness rules 
explicit, transforming them through role play, or by choosing specific group 
formation (avoiding or favoring work among friends, or mixing students in terms of 
gender, academic results, social class, etc.) can be explored as potential ways to 
develop emotions beneficial for the targeted educational goals.  However, it seems 
more difficult to find strategies that may directly influence the cognitive function of 
emotions in schematization. On that point, the history that the group and the 
individual members have with the topic, together with the media and social 
interdiscourse (Amossy, 2006, p. 94-99) that structures both pre-existing 










this aspect, research reports on experiences of how school treats socio-scientific 
issues involving media analysis seem particularly interesting (e.g. Jimenez-
Aleixandre, 2006). 
Appendices 
A. Transcripts of two discussion phases at table 2, Kenosha, USA, May 2012. 
A.1 Kelly, Sabrina, Louise, Pamela’s debate on OQ1: 
1. AMY [&and it starts now\    
2. PAM [i think it's    
3. LOU B:\    
4. PAM [((looks at LOU then the screen))    
5. KE [((looks at the screen))    
6. LOU cause i feel like people waste a lot of water    
7. KEL yeah    
8. LOU like washing [their dishes like&    
9. PAM       [yeah:\    
10. LOU &before they put them in the dishwasher [brushing your teeth    
11. KEL       [or showers    
12. SAB yeah\    
13. LOU [showering    
14. PAM [sho[wers yeah\  
15. KEL        [they take long (.) showers    
16. SAB ((nods head in the affirmative))    
17. SAB <((nodding head in the affirmative)) uhuh>    
18. PAM or like=   
19. LOU =or just like other stuff    
20. PAM people like when they brush their teeth (.) they leave the water running/ or like you wash your 
face whatever    
21. SAB <((nodding head in the affirmative)) uhuh>    
22. KEL ((nods head in the affirmative))    
23. LOU or like people that throw away like bottled water [or half the time like it's like it's not even 
finished and they'll just throw it away    
24. KEL <((nodding head in the affirmative)) [yeah>    
25. LOU              [so i think it's [B  
26. SAB          [or they dump it out on the sidewalks    
27. KEL or like washing your car  
28. PAM yea[h:    
29. LOU       [oh yeah    
30. SAB [((nodding head in the affirmative))   
31. KEL [and then all the chemicals in it just go in the grass (.) <((turning head)) which is not good 










33. SAB [((nods head in the affirmative))   
34. T2 ((get away from the center of the table))  
35. SAB [((stretches))    
36. LOU [((stretches))    
37. LOU <((stretching)) so do we agree [on B/ >    
38. KEL      [<((getting close to the stand)) so  B\=>    
39. PAM <((showing the stand with her finger)) put B on the thing\>    
40. SAB ((puts letter B on the stand))    
41. LOU [((stretches))   
A.2 Kelly, Sabrina, Louise, Pamela’s debate on OQ3: 
1. LOU er: i think it should be priced by its quality because if [you'd have better quality it's just more 
work to like x it\    
2. KEL           [((nodding head in the affirmative, 
looking at LOU)  
3. KEL em: there's more [production <((turning hands)) for it to>    
4. LOU              [((turning hands))  
5. LOU yeah\    
6. KEL yeah\    
7. KEL [em:    
8. SAB [and what about (.) family income/ [you need water\    
9. PAM          [yeah i also think D too 'cause like i don't think like less 
fortunate people should be (.) punished like you know what i mean like because they don't have money 
they pay for water they shouldn't (.) [not get water   
10. LOU                             
[yeah  
11. SAB                             
[xx time it's  not their (fault)=    
12. LOU =they could like they could overu:se like they could (.) not pay as much and [<((turning 
hands)) get more water>&  
13. PAM         [and take advantage 
of that yeah: it's true   
14. LOU &take advantage of it\ (.) when like it should be [<((swinging hands))  equal for all people>&    
15. KEL              [((nodding head in the affirmative))    
16. LOU &you know what i mean/ 'cause like in like it's their fault that they are (.) poor\  in a way 
because they could go find a job but they didn’t like you know what i mean/    
17. PAM yeah    
18. LOU like i think it should be equal among everyone\    
 (3.8) 
19. KEL er:    
20. LOU er: i would say C but what are you guys [saying/    
21. SAB                  [what did you x  the quality that was    
22. LOU like [in a xxx water    
23. KEL        [that's bad water or [the water    
24. LOU        [xxx water  is like more expensive than our like  (gross) water which is 










25. LOU [((shrugs))    
26. KEL [it's because like it's like [processed more and like    
27. LOU          [xxx water\    
28. SAB         [((nodding head in the affirmative))    
29. LOU it's processed more [and  
30. SAB   [yeah\ i think it's either  C or D\    
31. LOU it actually takes work to go like get it and find out xx    
32. MAR okay so: [if you guys actually wanna pull up your letter now/ let's get started    
33. SAB                 [maybe C AND D\ 'cause [like    
34. PAM just pu- just put C:\     
35. SAB ((taking card C)) 
36. KEL put D\ no put C    
37. MAR you guys put your letters [up xx\  
38. SAB what/    
39. KEL i don't know:\     
(0.8) 
40. SAB [we should put    
41. PAM [just put C and i'll explain like why we think D too\    
42. KEL yeah:\    
43. SAB <((putting card C)) well i'm putting C\>    
44. LOU C\    
B. Distance to the issue: key features from Klara, Isabelle, Asa and Samira’s 
debates on OQ2 and OQ3. 
In the following tables, are reproduced the parts of the transcript corresponding 
to the students’ discursive construction of their emotional distance to the issue. 
Three parameters are studied: the description of people concerned, the 
identification of people responsible for change, and the spatiotemporal distance to 
the issue. 
During the group discussion about OQ2, no key marker of the spatiotemporal 
distance to the issue was identified.  
Only one utterance described the people concerned:  
OQ2 group discussion – people concerned 
speaker utterance 
ISA   
c'est qui s'rait moins pollué/ <((se désignant)) c'est nous>   (who would be less 
polluted/ <((gesture to herself)) it would be us\>) 
On the contrary, the students extensively describe, during the group discussion 
on OQ2, the people presented as responsible of the evolution of the situation: 











KLA nan jamais moi\   (no i would never ever\) 
SAM <((à KLA)) arrêtes de faire aucun effort>   (<((to KLA)) stop making no effort>) 
KLA moi j'fais pas l'C   (i don't do the C\) 
KLA 
moi j'fais aucun des efforts hein\ c'est pas une personne qui va tout changer hein\>   
(i don't make any effort okay\ it's no one person who's gonna change everything 
okay\) 
ISA 
moi c'est la E\ y'a plusieurs personnes qui changent/ ça va changer\   (me it's E\ 
if several people change/ that would make a difference\) 
KLA moi j'en f'rais pas partie\   (i would not take part in it\) 
SAM si une personne   (if someone) 
KLA 
c'est pas deux personnes qui vont tout changer quoi\    (it's not two peeople who 
are gonna change everything\) 
ISA plusieurs personnes ça va changer\   (several people that will make a difference\) 
SAM des gens ils sont feignants\   (some people are lazy\) 
KLA moi j'le f'rai pas\   (i would not do it\) 
ASA les gens   (the people) 
SAM 
ils continuent à faire des véhicules et ils en achètent   (they keep on making cars 
and they buy them) 
ASA 
on s'appelle pas tous samira et et klara hein\    (we're not all called samira and 
klara okay\) 
ISA qui commencent à l'faire   (who start doing it) 
SAM j's'rais pas capable   (i would not be able) 
KLA j'pourrais pas ne pas les changer   (i could not not change them) 
ASA  on va prendre moins d'douches   (we're gonna take fewer showers) 
ISA si tu fais ces efforts-là   (if you make that kind of effort) 
ASA 
le monde il est entouré d'vous (…) mademoiselle klara et mademoiselle samira   
(the world is surrounded by you (…) miss klara and miss samira) 
KLA moi j'f'rai aucun effort\   (i would not do any effort) 
ISA si on les arrêtait (…) si on les écoutait   (if we stopped (…) if we listened to them) 
SAM mais ils arrêtent pas   (but they don't stop) 
SAM personne n'arrête   (nobody stops) 
KLA c'est pas nous qui changerions l'monde   (it's not us who could change the world) 
ISA faut qu't'essaies   (you must try) 
KLA personne fait des efforts   (nobody makes any effort) 
ISA qui commencent à arrêter   (who starts to stop) 
ISA si on arrête    (if we stop) 










During the class debate that follows the group discussion on OQ2, the students 
keep on talking at their table. Below are reproduced the elements of their speech 
that contribute to the specification of an emotional distance to the issue: 
speaker utterance key feature 
KLA 
ça va pas changer qu' y ait deux ou trois personnes   (it 





y'aurait moins que la moitié   (there would be less than 
half) 
 responsibility of 
others 
ISA 
trois millions d'personnes ça va changer   (three million 









si on est trois millions ça changera   (if there are  three 




nous chronométrer dans la douche\   (timing us when 
we're having a shower\) 
 1st person as both 
victim & responsible 
agent 
ISA 
si y'a plusieurs millions d'personnes   (if there are 
several million people) 
responsibility of 
others 




c'est la nouvelle génération on est pourri gâté   (it's the 




SAM à c't'époque   (in these days) current time 
KLA va trouver la foi en les gens   (go find faith in people) 
responsibility of 
others 




on pense pas\ on pense à la vie\   (we do not think\ we do 
not think about life\) 
own responsibility   
current time  
KLA moi mes besoins j'les f'rai   (me my needs i will do them) own responsibility 
SAM 
ma douche j'y passe trente minutes j'la ferai   (i spend 
thirty minutes in my shower i'll do it)  own responsibility 
ASA 
s'chronométrer dans la douche\   (timing someone when 


















tu vas pas faire ça hein\ ça sert à quoi   (you're not gonna 
do this\ what for/) 
 2nd person as both 
victim & responsible 
agent 
SAM 
y'a du savon tu sors quand même\   (if there's still soap 
you still have to get out\) 
 2nd person as both 
victim & responsible 
agent 
SAM 
mais à autrans euh nan j'sais plus quoi en russie ils 
étaient chronométrés deux minutes par douche\   (but in 
autrans er no i don't remember what in russia they were 
limited to two-minute showers)  
far in space & 
people concerned 
SAM 





en russie vous aviez moins d'cinq minutes   (in russia you 
had less than 5 minutes) 
far in space & 
time, 2nd person 
concerned 
KLA 
t'es habituée à faire un truc tu vas pas changer   (you're 
used to doing something your not gonna change) 




bah c'est la personne que t'es c'est la personne que t'es\   
(that's who you are that's who you are\) 
 2nd person as both 
victim & responsible 
agent 
KLA 
tu vas pas arriver avec en pat d'eph au bahut\   (you're not 
gonna come to school with bell bottom pants on\) 
  2nd person as both 
victim & responsible 




les pubs qu'ils font ça donne envie   advertisements make 




s'chronométrer dans la douche\   (timing someone when 
he's having a shower) 
 others are 
concerned 
ISA 
qu'est-ce que j'f'rais sans mes bains moi\   (what would i 
do without my baths\) 
 1st person 
concerned 
 
KLA notre hygiène de vie   (our daily hygiene) 
1st person 
concerned 
ISA on va prendre les conséquences de nos actes\  
near future, 1st 
person as both victim 
and responsible agent 
KLA 
moi j'vais pas changer pour les autres\   (i'm not gonna 
change for others\) 
 1st person 
responsible, others are 
concerned 
ASA  
pas pour les autres pour toi ta vie ta santé la santé de tes 
enfants\  pour tout\   (not for others for you your health your 
children's health\ for everything\)  
future,  2nd person 
as both responsible 










ISA enfants p'tits-enfants   (children grandchildren) 
far future, 2nd 
person concerned 
(through others who 
are near) 
KLA 
j'vais pas changer mes habitudes à m'faire chier à faire 
pipi caca dans l'truc 
 1st person as both 
victim and responsible 
agent 
SAM 
on va pas mettre un chronomètre   (we're not gonna get a 
timer) 
 1st person as both 
victim and responsible 
agent 
KLA faire chier mes parents   (annoy my parents) 
 1st person as both 
victim and responsible 
agent (through near 
others) 
KLA 
au bout d'un moment j'le f'rais si y'en a vraiment b'soin\ 
mais là   (after some time i'd do it if it was really needed\ but 
now) 
future,   
own responsibility 
SAM 
t'es plein d'savon tit tit il faut qu'je sorte là ça a sonné\   
(you're full of soap tit tit but you  have to get out now it 
rang\) 
 1st person as both 
victim and responsible 
agent 
KLA 
moi j'change pas mon mode de vie pour l'eau   (me i'm 
not changing my lifestyle for water) 
 1st person as 
responsible agent, no 
real victim 
ASA 
les efforts c'est qu'les gens ils arrêtent de mentir\   (main 
effort is when people stop lying\) 
 others’ 
responsibility 
ISA t'arrêtes de laver ta voiture   (you stop washing your car) 
own and 2Nd 
person responsibility 
SAM arrêter d'laver sa voiture   (stop washing one's car) 
everybody’s 
responsibility 
KLA moi j'le fais pas   (i'm not doing it) own responsibility 
SAM tu vas laver avec   (you gonna wash with) 




 tant qu't'es pas allée dans l'futur   (as long as you didn't 
go into the future) future 
The class debate about OQ2 is also an opportunity for some of the students in 
the studied group to make public contributions to the discussion. The parts of their 
speech that frame their distance to the problem only consider the parameter of the 
















M personne (...) fait quelque chose\   (nobody (…) does anything\) 
SA
M personne va l'faire\   (nobody is gonna do it\) 
AS
A °samira°   (°samira°) 
SA
M 
certaines personnes vont l'faire\ mais pas la majorité\   (some people would dot it\ 
but not the majority\) 
The discussion of the OQ3 is also an opportunity for the students to elaborate on 
their emotional distance to the topic. First, they do so during the group debate: 
spea
ker utterance key features 
KL





on est tous égaux et au fond on est tous des humains\ on a 
tous les mêmes droits\    (we are all equal and in the end we are all 





M en afrique ils ont pas d'eau\   (in africa they don't have water\) 
far in space and 
others are concerned 
KL
A 
ils ont rien\ pourtant ils paieraient quoique   (they don't have 
anything\ they would pay though unless) 
 3rd person 
victim and slightly 
responsible agent 
SA
M ils ont d'l'eau   (they have water) 
 others are 
concerned 
SA




A abuse pas   (don't exagerate) 




 et après on perd des et après on perd   (and after we lose some 
and after we lose) 




elle veut être démocratique vas-y vas-y\   (she wants to be 
"democratic" go ahead go\) 




l'eau ils la vendent plus cher\ pour gagner plus\   (they sell 




M ils devraient vendre au prix   (they should sell it at cost) 
others 
responsibility 
ISA ton robinet   (your tap) 
1st person 
concerned 
ISA si tu paies tout   (if you pay everything) 











Klara, Isabelle, Asa and Samira, during the class debate about OQ3, either 
directly contributing, or making aside commentaries at the group level, keep on 
framing their distance to the issue: 
speaker utterance key features 
ISA 
parce que si tu utilises pas beaucoup d'eau et qu'tu paies 
rien   (because if you don't use a lot of water and you don't 
pay anything 
2nd person as both 
vicim & responsible 
agent 
ISA 
si t'es t'utilises beaucoup d'eau et tu paies le même prix 
qu'si t'en utilisais pas beaucoup   (if you use a lot of water 
and you pay the same price as if you were not using a lot) 
2nd person as both 
victim & responsible 
agent 
ISA 





si t'utilises pas beaucoup d'eau et qu'tu paies un prix 
comme si t'en utilisais beaucoup   (if you don't use a lot of 
water and you pay a price as if you were using a lot) 
2nd person as both 
victim & responsible 
agent 
ISA 
 en afrique l'eau elle coûte cher/   (in africa the water is 
exprensive/) far in space 
ASA après ça dépende des   (after it depends on the) far in space 
SAM 





dans une même ville y'en a qu'i's'ont plus d'eau que 
d'autres\   (in the same city some have more water than 
others\) 
far in space (still 
africa), others are 
concerned 
ASA d'autres   (others) others are concerned 
ISA ils paient cher/   (do they pay a high price/) others are concerned 
ISA vu que c'est très sec   (as it is very dry) far in space 
ASA 
où nos grands-parents ils habitent (…)  au bled   
(where our grandparents live (…) in the village) 
near to Asa, far from 
others, for people 
concerned, far in space 
ASA 
(where there's no water problem): allemagne (…) 
amérique (…) france (…) royaume-uni   (germany (…) 
united states (…) france (…) united kingdom) far in space 
ISA 
si l'eau était chère en afrique   (if the water was 
expensive in africa) far in space 
ASA 
bah ça dépend des endroits   (so it depends where -in 
africa) far in space 
ISA au sénégal   (in senegal) far in space 
ASA elle est chère à dakar   (is it expensive in dakar) far in space 
ASA 
j'ai pas payé d'eau quand j'suis allée\   (i did not pay for 










C. Transcript conventions. 
Here are detailes the main transcript conventions used in this article: 
[    beginning of speech overlap 
:    elongated sound 
<((laughing)) uterrance> commentaries on simultaneous coverbal behaviour 
&    continuation of a speech turn 
=    rapid succession of words/sounds 
SPE ((turn))  non-verbal turn (laugh, gesture, etc) 
xxx    inaudible segment  
/ or \    rising or falling intonation  
(word)    uncertain transcription 
°word°    low voice  
WORD   augmented volume 
‘    non standard elision 
Notes 
1 They were especially trained during 1 day (6 to 8 hours) in order to moderate the 
café. 
2 Caffi and Janney (1994) oppose the two adjectives emotional and emotive to 
distinguish between what is felt (emotional) and what is discursively expressed 
(emotive). In practice, the relation between expressed and felt emotions is 
problematic and can vary depending on the context. In this branch of argumentation 
studies, researchers usually claim that they focus on the expressed emotions, basing 
their findings on discursive material, but often there is no evidence that expressed 
emotions actually differ from felt emotions. 
3 Facework, the activity of seeking to preserve one’s own and others’ face, or 
positive social value (Goffman 1974; Brown & Levinson 1988), is a structuring 
element of interactions, which leads the participants to obay a politeness code that 
constrains the development of the dialogue. 
3 This observation can be nuanced by the concept of ‘argumentative politeness’ 
that comes from argumentation studies. The specificities of argumentative 
interaction with respect to the matter of face preservation led to the characterization 
of a particular argumentative politeness system, which follows different rules than 
the ordinary system (Plantin, in press, p. 368-369). Then, disagreement is usual and 










4 The debate in psychology about the direction of causality between emotional 
symptom and felt emotion is embodied by the classical James/Cannon opposition 
(Cosnier, 1994). A well known psychology experiment illustrates how forcing a 
smile (e.g. holding a pencil in one’s teeth) can create the same internal 
physiological phenomena as smiling naturally because of an emotion (Soussignan, 
2002). 
5 Two other isolated occurrences of third person use present distinctive 
characteristics. One is Klara’s mention of the role of her parents in changing habits 
at home. Here we are typically in a “near other” construction. It also constitutes a 
transfer of responsibility, reminding the group that adults have more potential 
impact on the problem than the students may have. The other isolated occurrence is 
also attributed to Klara, during group debate on opinion question 3. Her 
formulation is ambiguous as she talks about the people lacking access to water in 
these terms: “ils paieraient quoique” (they would pay unless). It tends to present 
them as responsible for their exclusion to water access due to the fact that they may 
not pay the corresponding price. The topos of the poor people being responsible for 
their status is not developed here, but it is a leitmotiv in our data (XXXX, 2014, 
282-298). 
6 Conversational turns are not numbered here because it’s an inventory of 
discontinuous occurrences. The (…) stands for the discontinuity between the 
reported turns. 
7 This is our own translation from French to English, focusing on the global 
meaning and level of language rather than trying to literally transpose French 
expressions. 
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